I. Intntduction
In recetit years, substantial attetilion and controversy has focused on tests for racial discrimination in markets for financial services, especially in residential mortgage lending (e.g.. Berkovec et al. 1994: Holmes and Horviiz 1994; Ferguson and Peters 1995; Munnel et al. 1996; Harrison 1998) .' Insurance companies also are often alleged to engage in racial discrimination in the fonn of "redlining" that raises prices and restricts availability of coverage, and these allegations have received considerable public-policy attention.-Despite this controversy, little is known about the extent to which premiums are higher * We ihank the National Association of Independent Insurers for purchasing Iht* data. :in anonytnoiis reviewer. Doug Dianmnd. Anil Sliivilasani. :inU workshop participants al Ihe University of Michigan, the tJniversity of South Carolina, and the 1996 meetings of the American Risk and Insurance Association and the Risk Theory Society lor helpful comments.
1. Als() see the compendiuim <»f essays edited by Yezcr. Lit>d.sey. and Isaac (1995) and by Stcgman and Goering (1996) . Much of the early empirical litcraiure on discrimination focuses on labor markciii (e.g., Ashenfeiter and Rees 1973) .
2. See. e.g.. Squires. DeWoIfc. and DeWolfe (1979) atid Squires. Velez. and Taeubcr i 1991) . Klein (1995) provides a brief survey of the literature. Congress held extensive hearings regarding iilleged insurance rodlinin (: in 1993 (Insurame Redlining Pruiiiics 1993 . and a nutiiber of slate insurance departments have studied the issue and fed pressure to adopi regula-(e.g.. Harrington and Niehaus 1992) .
{Journal of Business. 1998, vol. 71. no. 3) © 1998 by The University of Chicago. AH rights reserved. 0021 -9398/98/7103-O005$O2.5O Following Becker's (1993) suggestion that tests for discriminiUion shtiuld altempl to inftrr whether protits differ for products si)ld to minorities and nonminorities. this article tests the hypothesis that racial discrimination affects market prices of auto insurance in Missouri. Compared with tests for discrimination in lending miykcts. our results are less susceptible to bias from omitted variables. Controlling for available detnographic and coverage-related factors, we do not find ihal loss ratios at the zipcode level are negalively related to percent tiiinority population. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that racial discrimination increases premiums relative to expected claim costs for minorities.
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in areas with large tninority populations relative to the costs of providing coverage in these areas.R acial discrimination that had a substantive effect on the supply of insurance would itnply unexploited prolitable investment opportunities and thus would require pervasive prejudice and significant eniry harriers for potential nonprejudiced entrants. The existence of large numbers of insurers that art licensed to write auto insurance in most states with relatively low market concentration and entry costs (e.g., Klein 1989; Cummins and Tennyson 1992) militates against substantive economic effects from racial discrimination. The altetTiative hypothesis is that racial prejudice is pervasive enough in conjunction with entry costs or other market imperfections to allow di.scrimlnatory practices to hiirm minorities significantly.
Following Becker's (1993) suggestion that tests for discrimination should attempt to infer whether profits differ for product.s or services sold to minorities and nonminorities. this article tests the hypothesis that widespread racial discrimination affects the pricing of auto insurance at the market level. We first present a framework for analyzing discrimination in pricing or risk selection. The key testable implication is that if insurers discriminate, either by charging higher markups in areas with high minority populations or. more opaquely, by applying more restrictive underwriting standards to minorities, then the ratio of expected claim costs to premiums (the expected-loss ratio) will be lower, ceteris paribus. in areas with a higher percentage of minorities, consistent with higher expected profit margins in these areas. We test the prediction that discrimination implies lower loss ratios (ratios of average claim costs to average premiums) for minorities using insurance market and demographic data by zip code from Missouri, one of the few states that has collected premiums and claim cost information by zip code."* Missouri's population exhibits diversity in terms of race and other demographic characteristics. Because its automobile-insurance market essentially is free of prior approval rate and underwriting regulation, the data can be viewed as the result of market conduct rather than regulation.
Tests of discrimination in mortgage lending using data on default rates and rejection rates have been controversial, in large part because of the possibility of omitted variables related to differences in credit 3. Klein (1995) finds that homeowners itisurancc average prtftiiiums for zip awJes in 33 metropolitan statislieal areas in 20 states are positively related to percent tninority population artcr controlling fur a variety of demographic variables. His models include a variable measuring averdge claim costs by rating territory, but this variable does not control for possible ditferences in claim cmts across zip codes within a Icrritory thai could be correlaied with percent minority population.
4, The loss ratio is a commonly used measure of (inversej price or {^ofitability in insurance markeu.
risk for minorities and nonminorities (e.g.. Berkovecet al. 1994; Ferguson and Peters 1995; Shaffer 1996; Stegman and Goering 1996) . The possibility of omitled-variable bias would be reduced significantly if mortgage-lend ing studies could examine a loan profitability measure that compared expected default losses with lending rales because any omitted variable affecting credit risk would influence expected default losses and lending rates in the same direction if lending rates vary with credit risk. Since measures of insurance profitability (loss ratios) are available and premiums vary wilh expected claim cosls. our predictions and tests for discrimination should be affected substantially less, if at all. by omitted variables related to possible differences in claim-cost distributions between minorities and nonminorities.
Controlling for a variety of demographic and insurance coverage variables that might affect loss ratios al the zip-code level, our key finding Is that loss ratios are not significantly lower in zip codes with larger minority populations. Thus, our loss-ratio analysis is inconsistent with the argument ihat widespread racial discrimination increases the price of automobile insurance in Missouri. An immediate implication is that comparatively high aulo-insurance premiums in urban areas with larger minority populations are attributable to high claim costs in these areas-not to discrimination. Consistent with this implication, univariate comparisons indicate a strong, positive relation between average claim costs and percent minority population by zip ctxle in Missouri, We also provide evidence that average claim costs remain positively related lo percent minority pt>pu!ation after controlling for a variety of demographic and insurance-coverage variables that could influence costs, which suggests that percent minority population is correlated with omitted variables that increase cosls.
We also provide evidence of the relation between percent minority population and the market share of so-called nonstandard insurers. which specialize in insuring applicants who do not qualify for coverage wilh insurers that specialize in providing coverage at lower premium rates to "standard" or "preferred" risks. Thus, nonstandard insurers are more likely to insure drivers with high expected claim costs and drivers wilh a greater likeiih(x)d of nonpayment of premiums or nonrenewal, which increases the premium needed to recover up-fronl underwriting costs over ihe expected duration of the contractual relationship. While our theoretical framework implies that discrimination via more restrictive underwriting will cause the market share of nonstandard insurers lo be higher in areas with a higher percentage of minorities after controlling for all relevant cost and demand factors, empirical analysis of nonstandard market share, like analyses of mortgage rejection rates, is highly susceptible to omitted-variable bias. Indeed, because our average claim-cost results imply that percent minority population is correlated with omitted variables that increase claim costs, these results predict a positive relation between the market share of nonstandard (higher-cost/higher-premium) insurers without discrimination after controlling for our demographic and coverage variables, which is exactly what we find. Moreover, our loss-ratio findings, which are inconsistent with discrimination, imply that a positive relation between nonstandard market share and percent minority population would reflect omitted variables. Thus, although our analysis of nonstandard market share by itself cannot distinguish whether a positive relationship between nonstandard share and percent minority population reflects discrimination or omitted variables, our loss-ratio and average claim-cost results strongly support the omitted-variable explanation.
A limitation of our analysis is thai the insurance market data are aggregated at the zip-code level and are not available separately for minority and nonminority drivers. We also do not have data at the zipcode level on nonloss costs associated with the production of insurance, including costs that could be related to differences in quality. As a result, we rely on reduced form equations that include percent minority population and other demographic variables for the total population rather than the insured population. While we can test for a relationship between loss ratios and percent minority population, we cannot directly test or control for possible racial discrimination through lower quality that might cause profits to vary by race even if loss ratios do not. Our finding that loss ratios are not negatively related to percent minority population, which is Inconsistent with racial discrimination in pricing holding quality fixed, is nonetheless important in view of the policy debate and dearth of empirical analysis in this area.
The next section develops the main hypotheses and the methodology for our empirical tests. The data and variables analyzed are described in Section IH. Results for the loss-ratio models are presented in Section IV. Our analysis of the relationship between percent minority population, average claim costs, and nonstandard market share is presented in Section V. Our conclusions are summarized in the last section.
II. Hypotheses and Empirical Framework
A. Risk Selection, Loss Ratios, and Nonstandard Market Share Auto insurers file with state regulators premium rates for a large number of "driver classes" and "territories." About half the states {but not Missouri) subject these rates to prior regulatory approval. In Missouri and most other states, rating plans (driver classes, territories, and associated rates) can vary across insurers. Since racial discrimination is illegal, rating plans cannot depend overtly on race, and a maintained assumption throughout our analysis is that race is not an underlying determinant of expected costs.
If persistent discrimination at the market level is feasible, there are two main ways that racial discrimination could influence prices charged insurance buyers.'^ First, insurers could file rates ihat exhibit a greater markup over expected costs for rating territories wilh a higher proportion of minorities, thus causing loss ratios lo be negatively related lo percent minority population. Second, insurers could discriminate by applying more stringent underwriting standards lo insure minorities than nonminorities. Such discrimination through risk selection would likely be more opaque than increasing markups in areas with large minority populations.
Insurers can decline coverage to applicants in Missouri and most other states. They use information other than driver characteristics included in their filed rating plan to establish criteria for accepting or rejecting applicants. The acceptance criteria ("underwriting standards"), often are proprietary and can vary across insurers, including across aftitiated insurers under common ownership. Stricter underwriting standards are associated with lower rates. If insurers apply stricter underwriting standards to minorities, then minorities would be rejected more often ihan is justified by unbiased forecasts of expecied costs. As a consequence, minorities would be pushed lo insurers with higher rates {and less stringent standards) and therefore have (o pay a higher markup over unbiased expected costs, thus compensating these insurers for their aversion to serving minorities. This form of discrimination would cause loss ratios in both the overall market and the nonstandard market lo be lower in areas with large minority populations, and it would increase nonstandard market share.
B. Model of Discrimination through Risk Selection
We present a simple model of racial discrimination through risk selection that yields predictions about the relationship between race, loss ratios, and market shares of insurers that specialize in terms of underwriting criteria. Although insurer specialization and nonstandard insurers are commonly discussed in the professional literature, there has been little formal analysis of insurer specialization wilh respect lo underwriting criteria.** The model also helps explain why differences in 5. Evidence on price variation in relation to expected claim costs in insurance markets is not readily reconciled with iiKKJcIsolnilioning (e.g.. Stigliu and Weiss 1981: Ferguson and Peters 1997) , Given mir datii ;ind fiicus. we also abstracl from issues of asymmetric inlurmalion and associated consumer ,'iorting a la Rothschild ami SliglJty (1976) . D'Arcy and Doherty (1990) and Dionne and Dtiherly (1994) develop models in which "low-bair" or "high-ball" pricing by insurer, in response lo asymmetric intormation could cause variation in loss ratios acniss insurers and over time in conjunction with differences in insurer growth rales. As noted below, we control for exposure growth in some of our tesLs.
6. Smallwood (1975) considers a nicxiei in which dircct-writing insurers apply more selective underwriting standards than insurers that use independent agents. Our model is analogous tu mtxJels of the effeci of discriminulion in mortgage lending on default rates (he distributions of expected claim costs between racial groups are much less likely to bias the analysis of insurance loss ratios than the analysis of nonstandard market shares.
Assume for simplicity Ihat each insurer uses the same factors in its filed risk-classification system with A' distinct risk (driver type and geographic territory) classes. 7 = 1, 2. .... A^. The premium charged by insurer k to all drivers in risk class j equals P]. An insurer's premiums will differ across risk classes in relation 10 expected claim costs (e.g,. young males will be charged higher premiums). The focus of this analysis, however, is on how premiums for a given risk class will differ across insurers in relation to their underwriting criteria (e.g.. State Fann or Allstate may charge lower premiums to young males than a nonstandard insurer). .Since the conceptual analysis focuses on one risk class, further reference to class j is omitted with the understanding that subsequently defined variables can vary across risk clas.ses.
Each consumer has a set of characteristics that place him or her in a particular risk class, as well as a characteristic that is observable to insurers, denoted Z. that influences expected claim costs, but which is not pan of the risk-cla.ssification system. Without loss of generality, we define Z in terms of dollars of additional expected claim costs above the base expected claim cost for the risk class, which is denoted -4. Thus, a consumer is assumed to have expected claim cost conditional on infonnation that can be obtained at sufficiently low cost equal to C = A + Z, where A is constant for all consumers in the risk class and Z varies across individuals within the risk class.
Underwriting for insurer k is implemented by setting a maximum value for Z such ihat il accepts black applicants if their Z is less than Mi and accepts white applicants if their Z is less than Ml. If A/J, is less than Ml. then insurer k requires, at the margin, a lower expected claim cost to insure blacks than whites (stricter standards are applied to blacks). The average expected claim cost for blacks and whites wbo are offered coverage by firm k is
where the expectation is with respect to the distributions of Z for black and white applicants for firm A.
If the distribution of Z for applicants that apply to firm k is tbe same for whites and blacks and if A/J is less than Afi (stricter standards are applied to blacks), tben the average expected claim cost for blacks of- (e.g.. BerkDvec ct al, 1994) . except that these m<xic!s invariably assume a uniform lending rale regardless of applicant crcUil risk. fered coverage is less than that for whites. In addition, given that the premium charged by insurer k, P\ is the same for all consumers (black and white) in a risk class, the average expected loss ratio for blacks offered coverage in a risk class is less than the average expected loss ratio for whites:
If the distribution of Z for applicants that apply for coverage with company k is not the same for blacks and whites, it is possible that the average expected claim cost and loss ratio for blacks could exceed that for whites even if stricter standards are applied to blacks. This could occur, for example, if there are relatively fewer blacks with low values of Z insured by company k. That is. although a lower value of Z is required for blacks, the average expected cost is nonetheless higher for blacks because there are relatively few low Z blacks compared with whites.' A related result has been emphasized in analyses of mortgage lending that consider whether racial discrimination implies lower loan default rates for minorities than for nonminorities (e.g.. Berkovec et al. 1994; Ferguson and Peters 1995) .'* However, tbis possibility has less relevance to the analysis of loss ratios in insurance markets where insurers vary premiums according to expected claim costs and underwriting standards.
To elaborate, if insurance companies specialize according to the maximum values of Z that they will insure and set premium rates accordingly, then companies with stricter underwriting standards (lower maximums for Z) will attract inframarginal applicants from companies with looser underwriting standards. This process reduces the variation in Z for a given insurer. With costless search and free entry, in equilibriutn, consumers will each buy coverage from an insurer that has a maximum value of Z equal to the consumer's value of Z. and there will be no inframarginal consumers. The expected claim costs for black and white poHcyholders with company k will be related as follows:
Since the price charged by insurer k is the same for blacks and whites, the expected loss ratio for blacks insured. £j,/P*, is unambiguously less than that for whites insured. ElJP\ if stricter standards are applied to blacks {Ml < Ml). Given similar behavior across risk classes, aggregate expected loss ratios are lower for blacks than for whites insured 7. This outcome leads to a somewhat perverse notion of discrimination. Specifically, if differences in ihc distribution of Z caused blacks to have higher average expected claim costs and loss ralios than whiles despite Mi < Ml, average expected prolits will be lower on policies sold to whites than blacks, in contrast to the standard for economic discrimination enunciated by Becker < 1993) . by each company, and market loss ratios are lower for blacks than whites.
Costly search and incomplete sortitig of consumers according to the maximum values of Z used by different insurers would lead to some heterogeneity in expected claim costs among insureds of the same race in a given class for a given insurer. Nevertheless, the analysis of insurer specialization with respect to underwriting criteria implies that the greater the degree of specialization, the less likely that any difference in the distribution of Z between whites and blacks could lead to higher loss ratios for blacks despite a higher underwriting standard for blacks, thus reducing the likelihood that loss ratio comparisons will be bixsed against finding evidence of discrimination (lower toss ratios).'
Nonstandard insurers can be viewed within this framework as having looser underwriling standards (higher cutoffs for Z). If the distribution of drivers across risk classes and the distribution of Z within a risk class are the same for blacks and whites, then tighter underwriting standards for blacks (discrimination) itnply a higher nonstandard market share for blacks. But nonstandard market share could be higher for blacks without discrimination if relatively more black drivers than white drivers were in higher risk classes or if relatively more blacks than whites had high values of Z. Thus, inability to control for all the factors affecting risk classes or Z could give rise lo a positive relation between nonstatidard share and race. We return lo this issue below.
C. Testing for Discrimination Using Loss Ratios
The theoretical fratiiework predicts that racial discrimination will cause loss ratios to be lower for blacks than for whites, holding non-claimcosts constant. To motivate our tests of this hypothesis with available data, we now describe a simple model of aggregate voluntary insurance market pricing at the zip-code level.'" Underwriting automobile insurance involves three types of costs: claim costs, transaction costs (administrative, marketing, and claim-processing costs), and the cost of investing capital to bond insurer promises to pay claims. Let EXPCC, equal the average (per exposure) of expected claim costs for zip-code /, and let X, equal the proportional loading factor ihat reflects the average non-claim costs for zip-code / and incorporates a present value factor. Then the average premium per exposure in zip-code / (AVGPREM,) can be written: AVGPREM, -n,X, 9. Also, the greater Ihe degree of insurer specialization, (he lower the likelihtxxl thai low-expected-loss consumers in a given risk class will select out and nol purchase in.surance.
10. The same framework applie.s lo los.-; ratios for the nonstandard market at the zipcode level.
where \x, is the average markup factor relative to expected average costs." Racial discrimination In risk selection or by using a higher markup in areas with larger minority populations implies that |i, will be higher in areas with larger minority populations, thus producing higher premiums for a given value of EXPCC,.
Average premiums also will clearly be higher in areas with larger minority populations without discrimination if expected claim costs are higher. In a similar manner, nonstandard market share will be higher in these areas without discrimination given that the factors causing higher expected claim costs will also Increase nonstandard market share. Thus, inability lo control for all factors that increase claim costs and that are correlated with percent minority population would cause both average claim costs and nonstandard market share to be positively related to percent minority population without discrimination.
Given the preceding expressioti for AVGPREM,, the expected loss ratio equals EXPCCyAVGPREM, = (HA.)"'-While the expected loss ratio is inversely related to both \x, and X,, there is less reason to expect that il will depend on expected claim costs and thus on unobservable factors that could cause expected claim costs to differ between races. As a result, the analysis of ioss ratios will be much less susceptible to bias from the omission of variables that are correlated with claim costs and race.'-Expected claim costs and thus expected loss ratios are not observable. Let AVGCC, equal realized average claitii costs and assume that Iog(AVGCC,) equals log(EXPCC,) plus a mean-zero random disturbance, e,. Taking the log of AVGPREM,, substituting for Iog(EXPCC,), and rearranging lenns gives log(LOSSRAT,) = -where LOSSRAT, -AVGCC,/AVGPRHM,.'' As discussed above, racial discrimination in risk selection or by using a higher markup in areas with larger minority populations implies that (i, will be higher 11. The distinct parameters for nonctaim costs (X,) and the average markup f|a,l would not he idcntiliahle using data on average premiums and average claim costs without a model of how these parameters vary with other factors. We introduce such a model below.
12. If there are fixed costs in selling policies and the effects ot discounting anil all other nonclaim costs are strictly proportional to expected claim costs, then the e.xpected loss ratio will he negatively related to expected claim costs. However, the magnitude of the resulting hias from omitted variables related lo expected claim costs should nonetheless be small given that fixed costs are likely to represent a small proportion of premiums. (See appendix A for further discussion.) Al.so sec n. 26 below.
13. An advantage of using the logof the loss ratio in our analysis and logs in our average cost equations (discussed below) is that it reduces positive skewness in the disturbances. The use of tog models for average claim costs is common (e.g.. Butler 1994) . and thus that expected and realized loss ratios will be lower in these areas.
Because we do not have data on the racial composition of the insured population by zip code, we cannot estimate a structural model of loss ratios, perhaps controlling for self-selection bias that could occur if buyers that face the lowest expected loss ratios (highest prices) are less likely to buy coverage. Instead, we estimate the following reduced fomi regression equation: log(LOSSRAT,) = /"^•^•^^^PCTBLACK, + piossRATji^^ + ^I.OSSRAT where PCTBLACK, is the percentage of the total population in zipcode / that is black, X, is a vector of demographic and other factors that could affect X,. the loading factor that reflects transactions/capital costs and discounting to present value. The estimate of yLossRAx p^^^^, sures the sensitivity of I-log(n,) -logO.,)] to PCTBLACK. If X, does not omit any variable that affects Xi and which is correlated with PCTBLACK. then a nonnegalive estimate of y-^^^RAi jj. inconsistent with racial discrimination in pricing. A negative estimate would be consistent with discrimination
The theory of cornpetitive insurance prices (e.g.. Myers and Cohn 1986) suggests that X. , will depend on (1) the timing of claim payments, (2) the risk-adjusted discount rate, (3) the amount of capital held to bond insurer promises to pay claims (due to tax and agency costs of capital), and (4) the expense "loading" for insurer underwriting, distribution, claim-settlement, and policy-service costs. With the possible exception of the risk-adjusted discount rate, these factors could vary across zip codes due to variation in demand for quality, in market penetration by direct-writing (exclusive agent) insurers with lower distribution costs, in renewal rates on existing contracts, and in the prevalence of multicar policies and opptirtunitics for cross-selling different types of coverage to a given policyholder. Data are not available by zip code to measure any of these factors directly, but variation in these factors should be related to demographic and coverage related factors that we can measure, at least approximately. We introduce the specific control variables in the next section and describe their possible relation to Xi in the appendix.
If PCTBLACK is positively correlated with an omitted variable that is negatively related to X, and positively related to the loss ratio, then the coefficient estimate for PCTBLACK in the loss-ratio equation would be biased upward and against finding evidence of discrimination. To argue that profits are higher for blacks than for whites without a significantly negative coefficient for PCTBLACK would thus require evidence that non-claim costs (X,) are materially lower for blacks due. for example, to (1) lower demand for quality by blacks that is not captured by our control variables or (2) discriminatory reductions in certain types of product quality.''* Finally, any correlation between PCTBLACK and omitted characteristics related to income or wealth that increase X,. by reducing renewal rates, opportunities for cross-selling, and so on, would bias the coefficient for PCTBLACK downward and toward finding evidence of discrimination.
m. Data and Variables

A. The Missouri Data
We analyze Missouri auto-insurance data for the period 1988-92 for collision, comprehensive (coverage for theft and physical damage other than collision, such as weather-related claims), and liability coverage (the data combine property-damage and bodily-injury liability). These data, which were obtained from the Missouri Department of Insurance, reflect reported underwriting results of all insurers with more than 500 exposures in Missouri. Since the insurance market data are analyzed in combination with 1990 census data, we aggregate these data over time and estimate cross-sectional models.
For each line of business, the data include the number of exposure units (car years), the number of claims, losses paid (exlusive of claimsettlement expenses), and premiums written by zip code for five policy (insurer) types (e.g., standard, nonstandard) and five exposure classes based on car value ranges or liability limits (see the appendix). We exciude policies issued by the Missouri Joint Underwriting Association (JUA) because the proportion of consumers that are insured in the JUA is small in all zip codes and because the state insurance cotnmissioner regulates JUA rates.'^ We aggregate the voluntary market data (non-14. Some evidence exists regarding pnxiuci quality differences between minorities and nonminorities in homeowners' insurance, but it generally relates to quality dimensions thai are unlikely lo biii.s our iests against finding discrimination, even if it is robust and geneniliziis to auto insurance. For example, Squires el al, (1991) provide evidence that insurers have fewer marketing outlets (agencies) located in areas with high minority populations. If associated with lower quality, this difference could reflect higher costs of providing marketing services in areas with minority populations, which would bias our results toward finding evidence of discrimination. In ii similar manner. Chan (I997t provides evidence that complaint.s against homeowners' insurers are greater in areas with high minority populations, which might suggest lower-quality service to minorities. However, if a greater likelihood of claims fraud and associated efficient insurer responses in the form of greater expenditures on investigating claims were correlated with percent minority population due to a relation with unmeasured factors, then expected loss ratios (exclusive of claim settlement costs, as is the case with our data) would be negatively related to percent minority population absent discrimination. Ihus biasing loss rati<i comparisons toward finding evidence of discrimination.
15. The JUA share of insured exposures for liability coverage in our sample of urban zip codes ranged from 0%-3.7% with a mean of .1%. The percentages are smaller for collision and comprehensive coverage.
JUA policies) across policy types and across exposure classes,'" We limit the analysis to zip codes with at least 1.000 voluntary market liability exposure units. Randotn variation in claim costs will likely be quite large and highly skewed in zip codes with few exposures. As discussed above, our key test for discrimination is whether LOSS-RAT is negatively related to PCTBLACK. We report results only for the 270 zip codes (in 17 counties) that fall within Missouri's six metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs): Colutnbia, Joplin. Kansas City, St. Joseph, St. Louis, and Springfield. Most of the controversy about race and insurance tnarkets centers on urban areas, and the MSA criterion eliminates zip codes with generally small numbers of exposures and relatively few minorities. The average number of exposures and average percentage of the population that is black are 9.097 and 1.5%. respectively, in the 613 nonurban zip codes versus 36,204 and 9.3% in urban zip codes. We also estimated models using all zip codes with 1,000 or ttiore liability exposures duritig the 5-year period with little change in the results.
16. The regression analysis includes control variables for the percentage of the market in dilfereni exposure classes. As discussed below, we also conduct separate analysis for the nonstandard market and for the voluntary market excluding nonstandard policies, as well as estimating models of nonstandard market share.
17. The loss data are for claims paid during a given calendar year. Some of these claims will be for accidents that occurred in prior years. The premium data are for policies sold in the calendar year, which should retlecl the present value of expected claim costs for accidents during the coverage period. Depending on the growth rates in exposures and in average expected claim costs per exposure over time and on ihc interest rate used in discounting, this mismatching of claims and premiums (which should only be material for liability coverage) could cause the LOSSRAT variable to differ from the expected loss ratio for policies sold in a given year (see Harrington 1992) . If growth rates in insured exposures or expected costs per exposure differ across zip codes, this mismatch could lead to a bias in our results if gmwth rates were correlated wiih any of the exogenous variables. The use of 5-ycar averages should mitigate the inismaich problem, In addition, we included growth in exposures as an explanatory variable and obtained results similar to those reported in the article.
B. Control Variables
The five exposure classes allow us to control for differences in average insured-vehicle value and liability-coverage limits that will affect expected claitn costs and possibly loss ratios. These variables also will likely be positively related to differences in wealth and incotue thai will not be captured by our income measures. For collision and comprehensive coverage, we include log of average car value (log AVGCARV). For liability coverage, we include the percentage of exposure units in coverage-limit class 2 (MEDLIMITS) and the percentage of exposure units in exposure classes 3, 4. and 5 (HIGHLIMITS). The omitted category is exposure class I, which includes policies with the lowest coverage limits.'" Information on demographic characteristics of the population by zip code was obtained from 1990 census data.'" The demographic variable of primary interest is the percentage of the population that is black (PCTBLACK). We control for a variety of other demographic variables in the models that reflect: (I) population density. (2) age distribtition and marital status, and (3) employment, income., and education. The demographic and coverage variables are summarized in table 1, which also shows how each variable (other than PCTBLACK} could be related to loss ratios (see the appendix for further discussion). The predicted effect of the variables on loss ratios is usually ambiguous.
We estimated models with and without county dummy variables to allow for fixed county effects. Including fixed county effects reduces the possibility of bias from any omitted factors thai have a similar effect on loss ratios for zip codes within a county, but we have no strong prior conceming material county effects. Because including fixed county effects generally produced results with the same implications for PCTBLACK and led to instability in the coefficients for some control variables, we primarily report results for equations without fixed effects. Given that the etnployment, income, and education variables generally are highly correlated and correlated with average car value and HIGHLIMITS, we focus on equations that only include PCTUNEMP from this category. We also report estimated coeffi-18. We treat these coverage variables as exogenous. It might be argued that they will depend on prices and thus loss rutios. These variables also could reflect setf-sclection associated wilh the applicatiiin and approval process, which might create some hia.s of unknown magnitude and diaxtion (see Rachlis and Yezer 1993) . Our judgmenl is that including these variables is likely Io increase efliciency and power to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between PCTBLACK and ihe loss ratio. We obtained results with similar implications for PCTBLACK when these variables were omitted.
19. The census files were prepared from U.S. Bureau of the Census data by CIESIN (Consortium on Intemational F,anh Science Network) with support from the National Aeronautics and Space .Administration. Zip codes change over time and consequently there is not a pertect match between the census data and insurance data. Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for the insurance market and control variables for the 270 urban zip codes with complete insurance and demographic data and for two subgroups: (I) all urban zip codes in which blacks comprise less than 20% of the population (237 zip codes), with an aggregate percentage black population in these zip codes of 3.6%, and (2) all urban zip codes in whicb blacks comprise more than 20% of the population (33 zip codes), witb an aggregate percentage black population of 61.3%. Table 2 indicates that blacks on average pay higher premiums, bave higher average claim costs, and higher nonstandard market share in each line of insurance, but loss ratios are similar for tbe two groups in each line."" Table 3 indicates that zip codes witb a relatively high proportion of blacks have greater population density (TOTPOP). poorer economic conditions and education (higher PCTUNEMP and PCTPOOR. lower MEDHINC and PCTHIGHS), and a much lower percentage of households with married couples (MARRIED). Relatively high correlations exist between PCTBLACK, PCT-UNEMP, and MARRIED (see tbe appendix).-' CoUinearity diagnostics described by Belsley (1991) suggest that the estimates on the average car value and liability coverage variables, MARRIED, and. to a much lesser extetit, the age variables could be "degraded" by collinearity. However, otir estimation results for these variables (i.e., frequently large /-values) often suggest tbat tbis collinearity is not likely to be harmfuK especially for MARRIED. More important, the diagnostics provide no indication that tbe estimates for PCTBLACK are likely to be degraded by collinearity." As is discussed below, we also estimated 20. Comparison of the nonsiandard market data versus the dutii for the toliil voluntmy market in the 270 urban zip codes (not reported in the tables) indicates that average premiums and average claim costs are approximately 30*?f-9()'yf higher in the nonstandard market with the largest increase for collision and the smallest increase tor comprehensive. Higher average premiums and claim costs in the nonstandard market are consistent with this portion of the market reflecting risk categorization and insurer specialization. Although the nonstandard market has higher average claim costs and premiums, the aggregate loss ratios for the nonstandard market are smaller than those for the overall market, which suggests diat nonstandiu-d insurers have higher nonclaim costs.
2.
C. Descriptive Statistics and CoUinearity Diagnostics
21. Regressions of PCTBLACK on the remaining explanatory variables in each model produced Rh of 69%-70^r without fixed effects and 727^-74% with lixcd effects.
22. Specifically, two condition indices and associated variance proportions generally suggesled '"near" linear dependencies involving the intercept (or county dummies), log AVGCARV. and MARRIED for collision and comprehensive coverage, and for the Intercept (or county dummies). MARRIF.D. MEDLIMITS. and HIGHLIMITS for liability coverage. The sum of the variance proportions associated with these two condition indices for PCTBLACK were less than .37. .24. and .12 for collision, comprehensive, and liability, respectively (compared with Belsley's 11991] suggested cutoff of .5 lo indicate potentially degraded estimates). the models excluding some of the regressors as well as including others. The conclusions with regard to the effects of the variable PCTBLACK are largely unaltered.
IV. Are Loss Ratios Related to Race? Table 4 presents weighted least squares regression (WLS) results for the ioss ratio equation for the overall voluntary market. The weight is the number of exposures in the zip code, given the prior expectation that the variance of the random error in average realized claim cosls is inversely related to this weight.-^ The key result is that loss ratios are not significantly and negatively related to PCTBLACK in any line. The estimated coefficient is positive for hoth collision and comprehensive coverage. These results are therefore inconsistent with the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, blacks are charged higher prices relative to claim costs than whites.
The positive coefficient on PCTBLACK is statistically significant for collision coverage. Reverse discrimination is an unlikely explanation of this result. Other possible explanations include random variation in 23 . SimiJar results were obtained using ordinarj/ least squares with White standard errors. .06 497 NOTE.-Obseniiiionsure for270 Miwiouri /ipcodes in im'lropuliiun stuiisiical areas using ajitia-ttalc insurance markei iJ;ila fnini 19JiK ihroii^h 1992; wcighi IS Ihc number of exposures: aKlTicients on portent variables arc niuliiplied by iOl); absolute / stalisiics are in parcnlheses bclnw cocnificni t."Miniaies. PCTBLACK is ihc proponion of ihc [xipubiion ihal is blatk. lug TOTPOP is Ihe natural logarithm of total pttpulalion. PCTI824 i& tht: peaentiige of the adult population between the ages of IH and 24, PCT55UP is the percentage of the adult population ttiat is .S5 years or older. MARRIFf> is the percentage of households »iih a tnarTicd couple. PdT'NEMP IN ihc percentage of the population ihal is unemployed, log AVCrCARV [•, the lop ot incragc insured car value billed on classiJications reported in the appendix. MUIJIJMITS is the percentage of liability policies with medium limits (exposure cltiss 2 in llie uppen-(lix). and HIGHI.IMfr.S Is the |)erct.-ntuge ofliability policies with high liinits (exposure classes 3. 4. und .S in the appendix;. OLS = ordinal^ least squares.
claim costs and varialioti in the demand for quality that is not captured by the control variables.
•"• if. on average, demand for quality is lower in /.ip codes with a higher proportion of minorities, then loss ratios will tend to be higher in these areas. This type of quality variation does not imply discrimination, however, as premiums vary with quality.
The explanatory power of the loss ratio equations is relatively low, which may reflect the ambiguous effects of the control variables on loss ratios in addition to sizable random variation in claim costs at the zip-ctxle level. Several of the variables have statistically significant 24. Also nole thai the probability thai random variation would lead to rejection of the null bypotlnrsis of a zero coefficient in at lea.st one of three lines uf business is higher (hun if only one line were being examined.
coefficients, suggesting that transaction/capital costs vary with these variables." The coefficient on MARRIED is positive and significant for both collision and liability coverage, which is consistent with lower average transactions costs in areas with more married couples due to larger renewal rates (persistency), a greater prevalence of multiple car policies, and/or becau.se tnarried couples are tnore likely to purchase other types of insurance (life and homeowners) with the same insurer. The positive relation between loss ratios and PCTUNEMP could refiect lower demand for quality in economically depressed regions (or unexpectedly high collision losses in these regions during this period).-'' Table 5 provides evidence of the robustness of the results for PCTBLACK for five specifications of the loss ratio trtodel that exclude one or more of the detnographic variables and for two specifications that include other demographic variables measuring econotnic conditions (LMEDHINC and PCTPOOR) and education (PCTHIGHS). We also show results obtained when fixed county effects are included in each specification. For collision and comprehensive coverage, only one coefficient for PCTBLACK is negative, and this estimate has a /-ratio near zero. For liability coverage, several of the coefficients without fixed effects and all of the estimates with fixed effects are negative. The negative estimates are significantly different from zero at the .05 level for a one-tailed test for three specifications without fixed effects and for one specification with fixed effects. Each of ihese specifications excludes MARRIED. There are good conceptual reasons for including MARRIED, as it may be a proxy for transactions costs and persistency. The variable MARRIED is often significantly related to the loss ratio (and average claim cosls. see below) for all of the coverages, suggesting that the preferred specifications include this variable. Thus, the overall results of our analysis of voluntary market loss ratios provide little or no evidence that racial discritnination gives rise to higher pretniums relative to claim costs in minority areas.-' 25. The signs arc not always consistent across lines, which might refiect random variatioti in claim costs across lines.
26. It might be argticd ihai ioss ratios should be higher in densely populated urban areas with high expected claim costs based on the presumption that underwriting and distributions costs increase less th;in proptirtionate!y wilh expected claim costs. While the cocfticienl un log TOTPOP is positive and significant fur iiiibility coverage, the negative ;ind significant coefficients on this variable for ctillision and coiiiprL'hcnsive coverage are inconsistent with this hyptrthcsi.s. The latter ri;sult.s might indicttte higher underwriting and distribution costs or lower renewal rates in more densely populated areas. Recall also that al! of our /.ip codes are in urban areas.
27. In order to allow for the possibility that loss ratios could be related to expected claim costs (see n. 12 above), we also estimated loss ratio mixJels that included the log of average claim costs. Given the random error (measurement emir) in average claim costs relative to expected claim costs, we employed instrumental variables estimation (compare Harrington 1987), using the log of the average premium by zip code as an insuiiment for the log of average claim costs. TTie coefficient on the log of average claim costs was not NorE.-Coefficients for PCTBLACK witfi absolute /-statjsties are in parentheses below frani weighted lea.st squares estimation for 270 urban zip codes; weight is the number i>f exposures; eocfficients arc multiplied hy I(H). PCTBLACK is the pniportion of the piijiulaiuiii IhiiT is hlack. PCTI824 is the percentage of the aduK pupuliitidn hetwceti the ages of IK and 24. K'T5.'it.iP is the percciilage of ihf aduli population thai is S.S years or older. MARRIED is the percetilage of households with a married couple. PCTUNEMP is the fwrLcntagc of the population ihal is unemployed. MtiDHINC is the median household ineome. PCTHIGHS is the percentage of the adult population that has hnishcd high school, PCTPOOR is tlie perccnt;ige of households with income IK'IOW the poverty level.
As is true for the overall volutitary tnarket. discritnitiation would imply thai nonsiandard itisurer loss ratios would be lower in zip codes with larger minority populaliotis. A priori, estimation of separate loss ratio tnodels for the nonstandard market is hitidered by ihe comparalively small number of exposures and correspondingly large random variation in average claim costs. We nonetheless estimated the reduced form models reponed in table 4 for nonstandard market policies using the 153 zip codes with at least 5(X) nonstandard liability exposures (the previous models required I, OCX) total exposures) and found little evidence indicating that loss ratios were negatively related to PCTBLACK. The coefficients, with r-values in parentheses, on PCTBLACK for collision, cotiiprehensive, and liability are .12 (.85), .68 (2.54). and -.06 (-.46), respectively.'** signiticant for any of the three lines, and the coefficients and (-values for PCTBLACK  changed very little from those reported in table 4. 28. Similar results to those reported in table 4 also were obtained when we estimated the loss ratio models excluditig nonstandard policies.
V. Are Average Claim Costs and Nonstandard Market Share Related
to Race?
An implication of our loss ratio results is that auto-insurance-affordability problems in urban areas with comparatively large minority populations are not caused by discrimination. Instead, as is suggested by the higher average claim costs in urban zip codes with PCTBLACK less than 20% than in zip codes with PCTBLACK greater than 20% (see table 2 ). higher premiums reflect higher claim costs in these areas. Higher average claim costs in these areas also would be expected to be associated with higher nonstandard market share without racial discrimination. This section presents additional evidence on the relation between average claim costs, nonstandard market share, and race. Table 6 presents WLS results of (1) simple regressions of the log of average claim costs on PCTBLACK for each line of coverage and (2) reduced-form models for average claim costs that include PCTBLACK and the control variables included in the loss ratio models. The table also shows predicted values of average claim costs when PCTBLACK equals 0% and 100% when all other explanatory variables are set to their sample means.'^ Table 6 indicates a very strong univariate relationship between average claim costs and PCTBLACK for each line of business. The coefficient on PCTBLACK declines in size in the multivariate equations, but it remains significantly positive for each line. This result suggests that our control variables omit one or more factors that are related to average claim costs and that are correlated with PCTBLACK.'" An implication is that these omitted cost factors will also be likely to produce a positive coefficient in reduced form models for nonstandard market share without discrimination. Table 7 presents the results of simple regressions of nonstandard 29. The predicted values equal exp(y)(X 100). where y is ihe predicted value of the log of average clainn costs (with average claim costs in SlOOs). While exp(.v) generally will not be an unbiased predictor, the bias should be small and should not affect the implications of these comparisons or similar comparisons for nonstandard market share (see below).
30. Estimation of separate redueed-fotro models of claim frequency and severity indicated a ptisitive and significant relation between PCTBLACK and collision coverage claim frequency, liability coverage claim frequency, and comprehensive coverage claim severity. We also estimated the average claim cost equations in table 6 controlling for fixed county effects. Tlie coefficient estimate on PCTBLACK continues to be positive and statistically significant for collision and comprehensive coverage, but it is not significant for liability coverage. We al.w estimated alternative specifications thai excluded some demographic variables and included other variables, but PCTBLACK generally remained posilively related to average claim costs after controlling for the other variables. Among other specifications, we included an interaction variable between PCT55UP and PCTBLACK to allow for the possibility that comparatively few elderiy blacks drive than elderly whites, thus increasing average claim costs in zip codes with greater values of PCTBLACK for any given value of PCT55UP. High correlations between the interaction variable and its components led to large standard errors for the coefficients for each variable. Noit.-Ob.scrvations arc for 270 Missouri urban /ip ctxfes using aggregate insurance miirkci data from 1988 through 19^2: weighi i.s ilii: number of exposures; coeftiticni.s with absolute r-siatistics arc in parentheses below; coeflicients on percent variables are multiplied by 100. PCrBLACK is ihe percentage of tlic population thai is black, log TOTPOP is [he natural logarithm of loial population. PCTI824 i.s the percentage of the adult population between the ages of 18 and 24. PCT.^5UP i.s the percentage of the aduli pfjpulation that is $5 years or older. M ARRtED is ihe percentage of hou.sehold.>i with a married couple, PCTUNEMP is ihe percentage of the population ihat is unemployed, log AVG-CARV is the log ol' average insured car value based on cla.ssifications reported in the appendix, MED-UMITS is the percentage of liability policies with medium limits (exposure class 2 in Ihe appendix). and H1GHI.IMIT.S is the percentage of liability policies with high limits (exposure classes 3. 4. and 5 in the appendix). Predicted AVGCC is the predicted value of avenige claim cosis for the specified value uf PCTBLACK with other variahles equal to ihe sample means. OLS = ordinary least squares. market share (in log odds form) on PCTBLACK and reduced-form regressions that include the control variables using least squares with White's heleroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.^' Because drivers will usually purchase each coverage from one insurer (and are required to purchase liability coverage), we report results for a model that includes MEDLIMITS and HIGHLIMITS (defined for the entire volun-31. The disturbance variance in the non.staiidard share model should decline wiili bolh ihe nutnber of nonstandard exposures and the lotal numtier of exposures. .72 3.6 4.7 NOTE.-Observations arc for 270 Missouri urban zip codes using aggregate insurance market data from 1988 through 1992; coefrtcients with absolute / staiisiigs using White sianilard emirs are in parentheses below: coefficients on percent variables are multiplied by 100. PCTBLACK is ihe percentage of the populatinii Uiai is hiack. log TOTPOP is the natural logarithm of total population. PCTIH24 is Ihc percentage of the adull population between the ages of 18 and 24. PCT55UP is the percentage of the adull population that is 53 years or older. MARRIED is the percentage tif households wiih a married couple, PCTUNEMP is the percentiigo of the population that is unemployed, MEDLIMITS is the percentage of liability policies with medium limiLs (exposure class 2 in the appendix), and HIGH-LIMITS is the percentage of liabihty policies with high limits (exposure classes 3. 4. and 5 in the appendix). Predicted NSSHARE is the predicted value of nonstandard share for the specified value of PCTBLACK with other variables equal to the sample means. OLS = ordinary least squares.
tary market) in each multivariate regression, as opposed to including the log of average car value in the collision and comprehensive equations (or including both types of variables in each equation). Table 7 also shows the predicted nonstandard market shares for PCTBLACK equal to 0% and 100% when the other explanatory variables are set to their sample means.^-As expected given the univariate comparisons in table 2. the simple 32. The predicted percentages eqtial 100|:/( 1 + :.)\. where z. is the predicted (unlogged) odds ratio. As an alternative, we approximated tjnbia.sed predictors of the tidds ratio assutning nomially disirihuied disturbatices and using exp(H + .5o-) where u is the predicted log odds ratio and o' is residual variance. The variance adjustment had little etiecl on the predicted percentages.
regressions indicate a strotig positive relation betweeti nonstandard market share and PCTBLACK. As predicted given the evidence in table 6 that PCTBLACK is positively correlated with omitted factors that increase claim costs, the reduced forms also indicate a positive and significant relation between PCTBLACK and nonslandard market share for each line of business, although the magnitude of the predicted relation is much smaller when the control variables are included. While the nonstandard market share analysis by itself cannot distinguish the omitted-variable explanation of this positive relation from a discrimination explanation, our loss ratio and average claim cost results clearly favor the omitted-variable explanation. Consistent with older, married, and wealthier individuals having lower expected claim costs (and perhaps greater persistency), nonstandard market share is negatively related to PCT55UP. MARRIED, and HIGHLIMITS. Results for a variety of other specifications had similiar implications for PCTBLACK (including models that omitted PCTUNEMP and included PCTPOOR, MEDHINC. PCTHIGHS. and fixed county effects).
We also used instrutnental variables estimation to estimate nonstandard share models thai included the predicted log of average claim costs from a regression of the log of average claim costs on the log of average premiums, given the random variation (measurement error) in average claim costs compared with expected claim costs (also see n. 27). Because the average level of expected claim costs for drivers in a zip code should be related to omitted cost factors, including this variable as a regressor n;ught reduce omitted-variable bias. However, a positive relation between nonstandard share and PCTBLACK is still predicted to the extent that, for a given mean of expected claim costs. PCTBLACK is positively correlated with the proportion of drivers with high enough expected claim costs to make coverage in the nonstandard market likely (or a negative correlation with factors related lo persistency). The coefticient on the average claim-cost variable was positive and highly significant for each line, and the coefficient for PCTBLACK declined in size compared wiLh table 7 (and was not significant for liability coverage). Given the results of our loss ratio and average claim-cost equations, this finding suggests that PCTBLACK is correlated with omirted cost factors related to the proportion of high-risk drivers and/or omitted economic factors that could affect renewal rates, nonpayment of premiums, and so on.'3 3. To explore whether crime rates mighl be importanl omitted variables in the average claim cost and nonstandard share equiilions. we obtained 1993 crime rales (offenses per thousand people) for a variety of violent crimes and motor vehicle theft for nine St. Louis and four Kansas City police districts. By overlaying police-district maps and zip-codes maps, we estimated crime rates for 47 zip ccxles in St. Louis acid Kansas Cily. We then recstimaied the average claim cost, nonstandard share, and, for completeness, loss ratio equations using just these 47 zip codes. While PCTBLACK and the estimated crime rates
VI. Summary and Conclusion
Following Becker's (1993) suggestion to analyze profitability to test for discrimination, we exatnine whether automobile-in.surance market loss ratios are related to percent minority population. Compared with tests for discrimination in lending market.s that use rejection rates or default rates, our analysis of loss ratios is much less susceptible to bias from omitted variables that could be positively correlated with both the risk of loss and percent minority population. Controlling for available demographic and coverage related factors that could influence autoinsurattce loss ratios, our main finding is that loss ratios are not negatively related to percent minority population. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that racial discrimination increases premiums relative to expected claim costs for minorities. Absent significantly lower transaction costs or reductions in quality for minorities that would materially increase insurer profits for any given level of the loss ratio, this finding implies that insurer profits are not higher for minorities.
Our loss ratio results suggest that auto-insurance-affordability problems in urban areas with large minority populations reflect higher costs of providing coverage rather than discrimination. Indeed, univariate comparisons with the Missouri data indicate a strong positive relation between average claim costs and percent minority population. In addition, our regression equations for average claim costs that include a variety of control variables generally indicate a significant positive relationship between average claim costs and percent minority population. which is consistent with omitted cost factors that are positively related to percent minority population. As predicted given this result, we also find that nonstandard market share is positively and significantly related to percent minority population after controlling for our demographic and coverage variables. When viewed in isolation (and as is also true for studies of mortgage lending that focus on rejection rates), our nonstandard market share results cannot distinguish whether this positive relation is due to discrimination or omitted cost factors. However, the combination of our loss ratio results, which iu-e inconsistent with discriminatioti, and our average claim-cost results, which are consistent with omitted cost factors correlated with percent minority population. provide strong support lor the omitted-variable explanation.
It would be desirable to have further research on omitted cost factors that could be correlated with claim costs and percent minority population, as well as research on whether quality differs materially between hlacks and whites, after controlling for other factors that affect the demand for quality, and. if so, whether reduced quality for minorities increases insurer profits. These types of research will be difficult with generally were posilively correlated, the inclusion of the crime-rate variables did nol alter the main conclusions. 
Control Variables and I.,oss Ratios
Definitions and descriptive statistics for our demographic and coverage variables are shown in tables I and 3. respectively. Table A2 shows the correlation matrix for ihe primary control variables used in the analysis. As noted in the text. X, (the present value of insurers' costs per dollar of expected claim costs) will depend on (1) the timing of claim payments. (2) the riskadjusted discount rate, (3) the amount of capital held by insurers, and (4) the expense loading lor insurer underwriting, distribution, claim settlement, and policy service costs. The speed with which claims are paid and the amount of insurer capital are dimensions of product quality, the demand for which is likely to vary with income or wealth.'"' Other quality characteristics that could increase insurer operating expenses also should depend on differences in demand. Insurer underwriting expense ratios (total underwriting and distribution expenses as a proportion of premiums) and thus loss ratios vary with insurer distribution systems, with direct writers generally having lower expense ratios and higher loss ratios than insurers that use independent agents." Direct writers also are known on average 34. Unobserved differences in property damage versus bodily injury liability mix could be related to Income or wealth, although the effect is iheoretically uncertain. Ctaim-settlemeni expenses will be lower bui claims will tend lo be paid Tasier in zip codes with higher proportions of properly damage liability claims. The effect of this mix on X, is thus ambiguous.
35. Whether this difference reflects a difference in service quality has been disputed (e.g.. Cummins. Weiss, and Berger 1997) .
for insuring drivers with lower expected claim costs than auto insurers that use independent agents, and direct writers tend to focus on business with high persistency. Insurers with customer bases with higher pohcyholdcr persistency (renewal rates) will tend to have lower expense loadings because front-end expenses can be amortized over a longer period. Persistency could depend on demographic characteristics, such as population mobility and income. Expense ratios and thus loss ratios also could depend on economies related to multiple-car discounts and possible economies of scope from cross-selling between the marketing of auto insurance and other types of insurance to a given household.
It is possible that expense loadings and loss ratios also might be related to expected claim costs. For example (and as noted in n. 12). if some underwriting expenses do not increase in direct proportion to expected claim costs (e.g.. fixed costs of processing an application), loss ratios could be related positively to factors that increase expected claim costs. Thus, any underwriting expenses that are less than proportional lo expected claim costs could cause loss ratios to be higher, for example, for young drivers and in large urban areas with higher expected claim costs. However, truly fixed costs are likely to be small, and it is arguable whether transaction costs within a state would be expected to increase less than proportionately in these cases. For example, it is possible that required compensation for agents and rental costs of facilities could increase proportionately (or even more than proportionately) with expected claim costs in urban areas or that risk selection costs could be proportionately higher lor young drivers.
With respect to our specific control variables, increased product quality, which should reduce the loss ratio, will likely be positively related to income, wealth, and coverage levels. The market share of direct writers, which also should be positively related to the loss ratio due to lower expense ratios, will likely be positively related to income, wealth, coverage levels, and perhaps PCT55UP and MARRIED, and possibly negatively related to PCTI824. given that direct-writer marketing strategies often emphasize business with greater persistency and opportunities for cross-selling other coverages. The effects of education could be similar to those of increased income hecause education could be correlated with unmeasured differences in income and wealth. We have no prior expectations concerning the effects of age distribution and marital status on the demand for product quality, other factors held constant, or concerning the possible effects of population density, Increases in population density could tend to increase the loss ratio if expected claim costs increase with density and transaction costs increase less than proportionately.
